I. INTRODUCTION
The United States Supreme Court held in North Carolina v. Pearce I that a presumption of judicial vindictiveness attaches to a sentence imposed upon reconviction which is longer than the original sentence and imposed by the same trial court judge. If vindictiveness and/or retaliation motivates the imposition of a more severe sentence on reconviction, that sentence is imposed in violation of the fourteenth amendment guarantee of due process of law. 2 On appeal, a reviewing court will invalidate the sentence. 3 A sentencingjudge may nevertheless rebut a presumption ofjudicial vindictiveness with reasons affirmatively appearing from the record and based upon the defendant's conduct after the original sentencing proceeding. 4 A presumption of judicial vindictiveness controls as a matter of law in the absence of such rebutting evidence. 5 Since Pearce, the Court has reexamined the constitutionality of 1 395 U.S. 711 (1969) . harsher resentencing under various other circumstances. 6 Most recently, in Texas v. McCullough, 7 the Court considered whether or not to presume judicial vindictiveness under Pearce even though a different sentencing authority imposed the more severe sentence on reconviction. 8 The Court held that the imposition of a more severe sentence by a different sentencing authority on reconviction does not create a presumption ofjudicial vindictiveness 9 -a presumption which imposes a burden upon the sentencing judge to justify the increased penalty.1 0 Moreover, because the petitioner in McCullough failed to otherwise show actual vindictiveness, the Court did not question the constitutionality of the harsher sentence."I The Court in McCullough concluded that a more severe sentence on reconviction does not automatically trigger a presumption ofjudicial vindictiveness. 12 Instead, a reviewing court must weigh the facts of each case to determine whether or not the probability of judicial vindictiveness warrants such a presumption.' 3 Unless the facts warrant, the law does not require a trial court judge to justify an increased sentence. 14 The Pearce Court failed to establish a clear standard for determining when a presumption ofjudicial vindictiveness is appropriate. The Pearce Court, therefore, left trial court judges inadequately informed of their obligations during resentencing under Pearce.' 5 This Note identifies the rough contours of the standard for determining when a presumption of judicial vindictiveness is applicable. Next, this Note ascertains the present scope of the Pearce rule' 6 and argues that its treatment in McCullough conforms with both precedent and sound public policy. This Note concludes that the Court in McCullough correctly chose to limit Pearce to those circumstances in which criminal appellants are most likely to fear judicial vindictiveness.
II. FACTS
Ajury convicted defendant SanfordJames McCullough of murder, 17 and imposed upon him a twenty year prison term.' Presiding Judge Naomi Harney subsequently granted McCullough's motion for a new trial on the basis of prosecutorial misconduct. 19 Three months later, with Judge Harney again presiding, a jury retried and reconvicted McCullough. 20 This time McCullough elected to have the trial judge fix his sentence. 2 1 Judge Harney sentenced McCullough to fifty years in prison and filed findings of fact as to why a longer sentence on retrial was necessary. 2 2 According to Judge Harney, new information on retrial implicated McCullough in the slashing of the victim's throat, and not merely in assisting in the murder. In addition, the fact that McCullough was released from prison just four months before the murder in question combined to warrant an extra thirty-year sentence. 23 On appeal, the Texas Court of Appeals reversed and reinstated McCullough's original twenty year sentence. 24 Even though the court of appeals noted nothing in the record to indicate that vindictiveness motivated the increased punishment, it nonetheless invoked the Pearce presumption ofjudicial vindictiveness. 2 5 The court of appeals also considered itself bound by the Supreme Court's decision in Pearce and held that a longer sentence on retrial could be imposed only if based upon the defendant's conduct occurring after the original trial. 2 6 According to the court of appeals, Judge Harney failed to observe the Pearce rule's literal requirements by erroneously relying upon events occurring before the original sentencing proceeding to justify the enhanced sentence. 2 7 Thus, the court concluded that a failure to comply with the Pearce rule was sufficient grounds for overturning the enhanced sentence, even though the record failed to "indicate that the increased punishment resulted from vindictiveness." 28 The United States Supreme Court subsequently granted a writ of certiorari to determine whetherJudge Harney's sentence did in fact violate the due process clause. 29 
III. TEXAS V. MCCULLOUGH

A. THE MAJORITY OPINION
Chief Justice Burger's opinion for the Court in McCullough turned significantly upon an initial determination that judicial vindictiveness could not have played a role in the resentencing process. 30 Absent a presumption of judicial vindictiveness, the reviewing court had no obligation to scrutinize Judge Harney's reasons for imposing the more severe sentence on reconviction. 3 1 Accordingly, the Texas Court of Appeals should have upheld McCullough's more severe sentence.
The Pearce Presumption Does Not Apply
The Court cited several factual reasons why it refused to invoke the McCullough's reconviction. 35 The Court recognized that an "institutional interest" explanation for the sentence applies to sentencing in all appellate settings, without regard to the existence of judicial vindictiveness. 3 6 The Court feared that "[p]resuming vindictiveness on this basis alone would be tantamount to presuming that a judge will be vindictive towards a defendant merely because he seeks an acquittal." ' 37 The Court refused to apply the Pearce rule to circumstances in which an argument for the requisite presumption ofjudicial vindictiveness was this speculative and its ramifications this overreaching.
8
Finally, the Court would not presume judicial vindictiveness if a different sentencing authority imposed the more severe sentence on reconviction. 39 
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could compel "absurd" results and should therefore be avoided where its purpose would not be served.
7
The Court specifically noted that by limiting reasons for a sentence increase to events occuring after the original sentencing proceeding, the Pearce rule would systematically preclude a sentencing authority from considering all relevant information in assessing the defendant's proper punishment upon reconviction. 48 A more sound application of the Pearce rule would not preclude a sentencing authority from considering new information related to events prior to the original sentencing proceeding. 49 In the Court's view, Judge Harney adequately complied with the Pearce rule when she identified, for the record, facts relevant to assessing McCullough's punishment which were not available for the jury's consideration in the original sentencing proceeding. 50
B. JUSTICE BRENNAN'S CONCURRENCE
In his concurring opinion, Justice Brennan agreed with the majority that judicial vindictiveness was only remotely possible in McCullough. 5 Suppose... that a defendant is convicted of burglary, a non-violent, and apparently first, offense. He is sentenced to a short prison term or perhaps placed on probation. Following a successful appeal and a conviction on retrial, it is learned that the defendant has been using an alias and in fact has a long criminal record that includes other burglaries, several armed robbery convictions, and a conviction for murder committed in the course of a burglary. None of the reasons underlying Pearce in any way justifies the perverse result that the defendant receive no greater sentence in light of this information than he originally received when he was thought to be a first offender. 
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McCullough warranted a presumption ofjudicial vindictiveness. 54 He first noted that the prosecuting attorney and Judge Harney made post-trial statements indicating their belief that the jury had been too lenient in sentencing McCullough to twenty years in jail. 5 5 According to Justice Marshall, these statements should have invoked a presumption of judicial vindictiveness.
56
The prosecutor publicly admitted that he sought a new trial in anticipation of securing a more severe sentence on reconviction.
7
A local newspaper quoted the prosecutor as commenting, "A guy's life ought to be worth more than that." 5 8 Likewise, Judge Harney said that she would have given McCullough a more severe punishment had she sentenced him after the first trial rather than the jury. 59 69 The dissent further argued that the Court's loose construction of the Pearce rule needlessly diluted its effectiveness because Judge Harney relied on additional evidence readily available to a trial judge on resentencing. 70 Such evidence includes a wide range of new information, from information pertaining to the defendant's participation in the offense to information providing new insights into the defendant's personal life and character. 7 1 If a trial judge resentences a defendant vindictively, the judge could circumvent the Pearce rule safeguards by referring to such readily accessible evidence in support of the sentence increase.
IV. HISTORY: NORTH CAROLINA V. PEARCE
The constitutionality of harsher resentencing has become a much litigated and often confused field, one that has been marked by delicate and controversial distinctions. 7 3 Due in part to its un- 65 Id. at 985 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 66 Id. at 986 (Marshall, J., dissenting). avoidably suspect overtones, harsher resentencing has, since Pearce, continued to provoke repeated constitutional litigation in all courts.
7 4 These developments reveal that Pearce is predicated on policies which need reexamination and reclarification. These developments also necessitate a reexamination of the judicially created methods for implementing the due process guarantees affirmed in Pearce.
In North Carolina v. Pearce, 7 5 the Court held that a trial judge resentencing a criminal defendant on retrial must justify an increased penalty by stating reasons which affirmatively appear from the record and are based on objective information about the defendant's conduct following the first sentencing proceeding. 7 6 In the absence of such justification, a reviewing court will sustain a presumption ofjudicial vindictiveness where properly warranted. 77 In Pearce, fourJustices concurred in the Court's judgment, and the entire Court unanimously concluded that vindictive resentencing violates the due process of law. 78 Since the trial court judge in Pearce On retrial, the same judge reconvicted and sentenced Pearce to an eight year prison term. The prison term, combined with the time he had already served in confinement, amounted to a longer sentence than was originally imposed. Pearce, 395 U.S. at 713 n.1. The record failed to disclose any reason for the increased sentence. 78 In a concurring opinion, Justice Douglas, with whom Justice Marshall joined, argued that the double jeopardy clause did not permit a "State because of prior error, to have a second chance to obtain an enlarged sentence." Pearce, 395 U.S. at 731 (Douglas, J., concurring) (footnote omitted);Justice Black concurred in the majority's opinion that vindictive sentencing violates due process of law. Id. at 737 (Black, J., concurring). Justice Black, however, qualified his concurrence by stating that Pearce was not in fact a case in which the trial court judge resentenced the defendant vindictively. Id. at 740 (Black, J., concurring). Justice Harlan also agreed that vindictive sentencing had no place in the failed to rebut a presumption ofjudicial vindictiveness, the Supreme Court ordered the district court to reinstate Pearce's original sentence.
79
The Pearce Court, however, summarily rejected the defendant's equal protection 8 0 and double jeopardy claims. 8 1 The Court reasoned that the double jeopardy clause does not prohibit imposing an otherwise "lawful single punishment" upon reconviction. 8 2 A corollary to the court's power to retry a defendant is the power to impose whatever sentence may be legally authorized should the defendant be reconvicted. 8 3 The Court accordingly held that the double jeopardy clause does not limit the severity of the sentence imposed upon reconviction. The Pearce Court also determined that the imposition of an increased sentence upon reconviction does not discriminate against defendants who succeed in getting their conviction set aside merely because "convicts who do not seek new trials cannot have their sentences increased." 8 5 The Court found this conclusion entirely consistent with the fact that new sentences are being imposed upon reconviction and not additional sentences. 8 6 law. Id. at 745 (Harlan, J., concurring). Justice Harlan, however, did not agree with the Court's interpretation of the double jeopardy clause and argued that the clause protects potential appellants from fear of being "placed injeopardy of suffering the greater punishment not imposed at the first trial." Id. at 749-50 (Harlan, J., concurring). Justice White also concurred in the Court's opinion with one exception. In Justice White's view, the Pearce rule should have authorized "an increased sentence on retrial based on any objective, identifiable factual data not known to the trial judge at the time of the original sentencing proceeding." Id. at 751 (White, J., concurring).
79 395 U.S. at 726. 80 "No State shall.., deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The argument here is that equal protection is denied because successful appellants are the only defendants whose sentence could be increased.
81 "[Nlor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb." U.S. CONsT. amend. V. This clause was made applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment in Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969 The Court reasoned that if a criminal defendant successfully obtains a new trial, he has implicitly acquiesced in the court's concomitant power to impose upon him a new sentence befitting the court's independent assessment of the crime. 8 7 The defendant may be acquitted on retrial. If reconvicted, he may receive a new sentence that is less than, equal to, or greater in severity than his original sentence.
8
The Court, nevertheless, recognized that procedural safeguards 9 were necessary to prevent state and federal appellate courts from "follow[ing] an announced practice of imposing a heavier sentence upon every reconvicted defendant for the explicit purpose of punishing the defendant." 90 The Pearce Court held that this practice violated the due process of law guaranteed by the fifth and fourteenth amendments. 9 1 As a preventive measure, the Court mandated a factual justification requirement for heavier sentencing on reconviction. The Court created this justification requirement in order to free defendants from fear, real or imagined, that a sentencing judge might punish them for initiating and subsequently succeeding in their post-conviction proceeding. 93 The Pearce Court stated this rule as: 87 Id. at 720. See also Tateo, 377 U.S. at 466: Corresponding to the right of an accused to be given a fair trial is the societal interest in punishing one whose guilt is clear after he has obtained such a trial. It would be a high price indeed for society to pay were every accused granted immunity from punishment because of any defect sufficient to constitute reversible error in the proceedings leading to conviction. 88 Pearce, 395 U.S. at 721. See also Justice Black's concurring opinion in Pearce, 395 U.S. at 738 (Black,J., concurring)("[D]efendants are not denied equal protection when the state makes no provision for re-evaluation of sentences generally but permits the penalty set after retrials to be whatever penalty the trial judge finds to be appropriate, whether it be higher or lower than the sentence originally set.").
89 These limitations do not proscribe the length of a sentence imposed upon reconviction; rather these limitations condition the manner in which sentencing discretion is exercised. See Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 725 (1969)("Due process of law requires that vindictiveness against a defendant for having successfully attacked his conviction must play no part in the sentence he receives .... ")(emphasis added Although the parameters of due process to be accorded at sentencing are not firmly fixed, it is beyond doubt that a sentence enhanced whether before or after commencement of service, because of vindictiveness or other plainly improper motive of the trial court would be fundamentally unfair and would deny the defendant due process.
Pearce also marks the first time that the Court has, in any case not involving a deprivation of equal protection of the laws, held unconstitutional a burden on a state right of appeal.
92 Pearce, 395 U.S. at 726. 93 Id. at 725.
[W]henever a judge imposes a more severe sentence upon a defendant after a new trial, the reasons for his doing so must affirmatively appear. Those reasons must be based upon objective information concerning identifiable conduct on the part of the defendant occurring after the time of the original sentencing proceeding. And the factual data upon which the increased sentence is based must be made part of the record, so that the constitutional legitimacy of the increased sentence may be fully reviewable on appeal. Since the rule prohibits a sentencing authority from punishing a defendant for successfully overturning his original conviction, 9 5 the rule should apply to harsher resentencing in all appellate settings.
6
The Court in McCullough, however, limited the rule's application to those sentencing proceedings in which a presumption of judicial vindictiveness is reasonably warranted.
9 7 If the circumstances leading up to the new sentencing proceeding fail to provide potential grounds for judicial vindictiveness, the resentencing authority is under no obligation to justify the imposition of a more severe sentence on reconviction.
V. ANALYSIS
A. WHEN DOES THE PEARCE PRESUMPTION APPLY?
Whether a presumption of judicial vindictiveness applies in a particular case depends on the factual context in which the more severe sentence is imposed.
9 9 Consequently, the facts upon which the Court in McCullough relied to justify withholding a presumption of judicial vindictiveness shed greater light on the parameters of Pearce.
0
The facts in Pearce adequately compelled a presumption ofjudicial vindictiveness. Since Pearce, however, there have been several cases in which the circumstances failed to raise such a presumption, even though the defendant received a more severe sentence on reconviction. 
2
An enhanced sentence on reconviction may not always raise a presumption ofjudicial vindictiveness.
1 0 3 Instead, only a natural inference ofjudicial vindictiveness will activate the presumption. As a threshold requirement, the circumstances must demonstrate either actual vindictiveness or a realistic fear of vindictiveness. 0 4 In McCullough, the Court feared that a less conservative application of the Pearce presumption would obstruct a legitimate response to criminal conduct. 0 5 Accordingly, the Court required a rational connection between the basic facts and the presumed facts in order for a presumption ofjudicial vindictiveness to pass muster; a mere opportunity for vindictiveness was considered insufficient to warrant a Pearce presumption. 106 Although Judge Harney's knowledge of the severity of the original sentence gave her an opportunity to impose a more severe sentence on reconviction, knowledge alone does not establish a sufficient basis for a presumption ofjudicial vindictiveness. See, e.g., Goodwin, 457 U.S. at 373 ("Given the severity of [presuming judicial vindictiveness] ... the Court has done so only in cases in which a reasonable likelihood of vindictiveness exists."); Chaffin, 412 U.S. at 26-27 (Pearce prohylactic rule does not apply when a jury imposes the more severe sentence on reconviction. The Court found that the possibility of vindictiveness was de minimis when resentencing was by a jury in a properly controlled retrial.); Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104, 119 (1973)(opportunity for vindictiveness is insufficient to justify application of the Pearce rule where a higher sentence is imposed after a trial de novo in those jurisdictions that employ a two-tier trial court system). See also supra note 104 and accompanying text.
impose on the defendant a more severe sentence on reconviction. 1 07 The possibility of such vindictive resentencing impermissibly deters defendants from exercising their right of appeal. 10 8 Consequently, if the resentencing judge also imposed the defendant's original sentence, the probability of actual vindictiveness on the part of the judge is high enough to impose upon him the burden of justifying the higher sentence following reconviction. 10 9 If the sentencing authority differs on retrial, however, the defendant will not be entitled to a presumption of judicial vindictiveness. 11 0 To be entitled to a presumption of judicial vindictiveness under these circumstances, the defendant must convince the reviewing court that conferring unguarded sentencing discretion upon a judge who will sentence the defendant for the first time on retrial creates an actual risk of vindictiveness. Only then should harsher resentencing by a different sentencing authority fall under judicial scrutiny as a means of adequately implementing the due process guarantee. 1 1 1
The majority in McCullough correctly determined that a threat of vindictiveness does not exist when the sentencing authority differs on retrial.' 1 2 If the resentencing authority differs from the initial sentencer, the resentencing authority has no personal stake in the original sentencing proceeding and thus no incumbant stimulus for retaliation.' 1 3 As a general rule, if a sentencing judge invokes his or her sentencing discretion for the first time on retrial, as did Judge Harney, the imposition of a more severe sentence on reconviction will not give rise to a Pearce presumption of judicial vindictiveness.
4
A presumption ofjudicial vindictiveness is also inappropriate if the "would be" resentencing judge, who did not participate in the 107 Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969) . 108 The deterrent is the fear that the defendant might receive a harsher sentence, especially if the harsher sentence is imposed solely because the defendant chose to appeal. original sentencing proceeding, voluntarily orders a new trial on the defendant's behalf." 1 5 Voluntarily ordering a new trial is insufficient grounds for presuming judicial vindictiveness. To constitute sufficient grounds, the resentencingjudge must at least be assured of an opportunity to resentence the defendant. In actuality, no such assurance exists. Instead, by ordering a new trial, the sentencing judge goes on record in support of the appeal and is therefore removed from any criticism an appellate court might otherwise direct towards the judge for the manner in which he or she conducted the original trial. 1 6 Accordingly, the trial court judge suffers no personal rebuke and, thus, has no reason to engage in the type of retaliatory sentencing on retrial presumed in Pearce.' 17 Furthermore, if a trial court judge voluntarily orders a new trial, he or she is attesting to the merit of the appeal. 1 8 As a result, the Court in McCullough properly determined that an institutional interest in discouraging criminal defendants from appealing could not have motivated the more severe sentence on retrial." 19 The facts in McCullough indicate that the defendant could have feared the possibility of receiving a more severe sentence on reconviction andJudge Harney's post-trial statements could have fostered this fear. 120 Despite their questionable nature, however, these statements could hardly have constituted a natural pretext to vindictive resentencing.' 2 1 Pearce did not seek to eradicate fear of an enhanced sentence. 122 Rather, Pearce meant to overcome the evil of judicial retribution.
123
Members of the McCullough Court agreed that a presumption of judicial vindictiveness requires a more severe sentence on reconviction. 124 
When Does the Pearce Presumption Apply?: Summary
The Court in McCullough revealed two factual conditions which sufficiently counteract a presumption of judicial vindictiveness.
128
As such, McCullough is the first Supreme Court case to clarify the proper thrust and scope of Pearce.' 2 9 First, a reviewing court will not presume judicial vindictiveness if a different sentencing authority imposes a more severe sentence on retrial. Second, a presumption ofjudicial vindictiveness is inappropriate if the trial court judge conducting the first trial voluntarily orders a new trial. Either of these exceptions will, in any case in which a criminal appellant receives an enhanced sentence on reconviction, make appellate review of the enhanced sentence unnecessary.
B. THE PEARCE PRESUMPTION: ITS PROPER APPLICATION
Since the trial judge in Pearce failed to set forth any reasons for imposing the heavier sentence on reconviction, 130 the Court in Pearce found it unnecessary to explore the type of conduct that might otherwise justify a higher sentence under the Pearce rule. Since Pearce, however, the Court has had to reclarify the rule's proper scope and application. 
REEXAMINING JUDICIAL VINDICTIVENESS
In order to protect successful appellants from a threat of retribution for appealing, the Pearce Court stipulated that a resentencing judge must set forth legitimate reasons for increasing a sentence on retrial.' 3 3 These reasons must be based "upon objective information concerning identifiable conduct on the part of the defendant occurring after the time of the original sentencing proceeding."' 134 The dissent in McCullough disagreed with the Court's reasons for expanding the scope of information upon which a trial court judge might rely to justify increasing a sentence upon reconviction beyond the Pearce rule's literal confines.
The trial court judge carries the burden of rebutting a presumption ofjudicial vindictiveness whenever it is warranted.
13 5 If a presumption arises, the law requires the trial court judge to comply with both the procedural and substantive aspects of the Pearce rule.' 3 6 Failure to comply with either one of these requirements will sustain the presumption and invalidate the sentence. Procedurally, the Pearce rule requires a resentencing judge to substantiate an increased penalty with objective reasons. These reasons must affirmatively appear from the record and must be based upon new information acquired since the original sentencing proceeding.1 3 8 Substantively, the new information must be compelling enough to rebut a presumption of judicial vindictiveness. 139 The information relied upon must convince the reviewing court that a rational connection exists between the new information introduced on retrial and the increase in punishment. 14 0 Introduction of new information alone will not overcome the presumption.
1
The dissent in McCullough reasoned that a court could easily circumvent the rule's prohibitions on retrial if the court was given an opportunity to justify an increased sentence on the basis of new in-133 395 U.S. at 726. 134 Id. 135 For instance, the facts in Pearce represent the predominant situation in which the presumption is always warranted-the imposition of a more severe sentence on reconviction by the trial court judge who imposed the defendant's original sentence. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969 
883
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formation concerning the defendant's participation in the offense. 1 4 2 Since Judge Harney relied upon new information easily available on resentencing, the Pearce rule could amount to a formal safeguard without substantive effect. 1 43 The dissent in McCullough accordingly asserted that requiring an on-the-record rationale for increasing the sentence will become only a perfunctory procedural necessity.
14 4
Clarifying the Appropriate Scope of the Pearce Rule
The Court exposed and overcame the Pearce rule's potential inflexibility for the first time in Wasman v. United States. 1 45 In Wasman, the Court held that after retrial and conviction following a defendant's succesful appeal, a trial court judge may justify an increased sentence by affirmatively identifying relevant conduct or events that occurred subsequent to the original sentencing proceeding. 14 6 The Court in Wasman disregarded the rule's limitations and expanded the scope of information upon which a trial court judge could appropriately rely to justify an increased penalty under Pearce.
147
142 McCullough, 106 S. Ct. at 987 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 143 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting). 144 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting). 145 468 U.S. 559 (1984) . 146 Wasman, 468 U.S. 559 (1984) . In Wasman, the sentencing judge relied upon an intervening conviction for acts committed prior to the original sentencing proceeding to justify the enhanced sentence. 
884
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Having deliberately avoided the Pearce limitations,' 48 the Court in McCullough implicitly prioritized the state's interest in punishing guilty defendants to the fullest extent of the law. The Court's continuing attempt to justify increased penalties on reconviction, properly warranted but otherwise imposed in violation of the express language of the Pearce rule, 14 9 amply justified tempering the rule's exacting standards. Prioritizing the societal interest in this manner, however, did not require the Court to jeopardize the effectiveness of the Pearce rule,' 50 nor compromise its commitment to safeguarding the due process rights of convicted defendants.' 5 ' Instead, the Court's reasons set forth in McCullough for relaxing the confines of the rule were entirely consistent with the reasons given in Wasman for the Court's earlier construction of the rule.1 5 2
Judges need wide sentencing discretion on retrial as much as they do in assessing punishment after the first trial. In both cases, a sentencing authority must consider all information relevant to assessing the severity of the defendant's punishment.5 3 The resentencing judge, with the latest information, can take a fresh look at At trial, the state introduced the testimony of two witnesses who had not testified at the first trial. The new evidence revealed that McCullough, rather than his accomplices, slashed the victim's throat. According to Judge Harney, the testimony of the two new witnesses strengthened the state's case on both the guilt and punishment phases of the trial. Judge Harney also learned at the retrial that McCullough had been released from prison only four months before the murder. See also Pearce, 395 U.S. at 751 (White, J., concurring). Justice White's concurrence in Pearce emphasized the harsh limitation the rule placed on the kind of information that could support an enhanced sentence. If the Court in Pearce had intended information other than that pertaining to defendant's conduct occurring after the original sentencing proceeding to be an acceptable basis for an enhanced sentence, Justice White's partial concurrence would not have been necessary. Justice White's version of the rule, however, was ostensibly the standard adopted by the Court in Wasman and McCullough.
149 Pearce, 395 U.S. at 726. the defendant's character at retrial and make a more informed decision regarding his sentence. 154 A court's ability to consider a wide range of information ensures that the sentence suits both the crime and the criminal.1 5 5
The dissent mistakenly implied that such wide sentencing discretion leads to but one result: a more severe sentence on reconviction. 1 56 On the contrary, wide sentencing discretion is an important means of providing a potential appellant with the opportunity on retrial to reduce his sentence or establish his innocence on the basis of new information.1 57
The Preferred Construction of the Pearce Rule
A flexible construction of the Pearce rule would allow a sentencing authority to consider events and conduct occurring before as well as after the original sentencing proceeding. 58 Giving the Pearce rule an otherwise literalist effect will systematically foreclose a sentencing authority from considering a breadth of new information that could materially influence the degree of punishment for a reconvicted defendant. 59 Withholding such relevant information 154 Congress has mandated that judges shall have available the fullest information possible for consideration in the presentencing investigation to aid judges in their task of imposing the appropriate sentence on each offender. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, 18 U.S.C. § § 3351-52 (1976 Pearce stipulates that a trial court judge, from whom a defendant received his initial sentence, is presumed to have acted vindictively if the judge imposed a more severe sentence on the defendant without the aid of new information reasonably competent to justify the sentence increase.' 6 1 Under Pearce, such new information is limited to the defendant's conduct after the original sentencing proceeding. 16 
2
There is, however, no reason why these conditions should arbitrarily preclude a trial court judge from generally considering new information upon resentencing. 163 Events occurring prior to the original sentencing proceeding can legitimately constitute acceptable new information having a significant bearing on the proper degree of punishment to be assessed. 6 4 The need to broadly construe the Pearce rule is also greatest whenever the new information becomes crucial to a disposition of the case.'
Similarly, when the trial record reveals new information about the defendant and his criminal activity which reasonably justifies a sentence enhancement, a presumption of vindictiveness should be deemed adequately rebutted. Moreover, to argue that a reviewing court will be in the untenable position of trying to determine if new information constitutes grounds for the harsher sentence, or simply a facade for improper motivations, mistakes the appropriate extent of the inquiry under Pearce. 169 Pearce and its progeny say nothing about requiring a reviewing court to question a trial court judge's motivation for imposing an enhanced sentence on reconviction if new information reasonably and objectively qualifies the sentence increase. For a reviewing court to indulge in speculation beyond the limits set forth in Pearce is neither necessary nor proper.
170
A trial court judge may rely upon new information related to conduct prior to the original sentencing proceeding to assess a defendant's guilt on retrial. 17 1 If resentencing is consistent with the double jeopardy clause,1 7 2 similar information should aid resentencing. 173 Unnecessarily restricting the type of information relevant to assessing punishment on reconviction, and not limiting in a corresponding fashion similar information in assessing guilt on retrial, will invariably lead to new sentences which are artificial and arbitrarily manufactured. 17 4 Contrary to sound policy and settled principles of criminal law, the new sentence will neither reflect the severity of the crime nor fit the defendant's potential for rehabilitation. Furthermore, a flexible rule will still satisfy the due process requirements if the reasons for the sentence increase persuade a reviewing court that there was a sound, non-vindictive basis for the court 187, 190 (1969) ("Sentencing has traditionally been a judicial black box, a realm ruled by trial court discretion insulated from appellate review. The shielding of sentencing from the normal adversary process is based in part on various arguments that each sentencing decision is unique and not susceptible to governance by specifiable standards.").
171 Because the slate is wiped clean, there is at least conceptually no new or old information on retrial. Moreover, reconvicting a defendant will never by itself raise a presumption ofjudicial vindictiveness. Accordingly, the safeguards applicable to assessing punishment on reconviction are inapplicable to determining guilt on retrial. [Vol. 77 sentence.' 7 6 Even without limiting the type and extent of information which may be considered in assessing punishment on retrial, appellate courts retain the ultimate authority to determine whether or not the trial court judge adequately justified the sentence increase. 177 Appellate review of resentencing decisions is further assurance that a non-vindictive rationale supports the increase.
Even if the need for a stricter application of the Pearce rule safeguards was clear, the question would remain whether the incremental benefit would justify the cost. 17 8 Employing this balancing test reveals that it is impossible to safeguard against judicial vindictiveness in every conceivable circumstance without inflicting adverse repercussions on the underlying policies of the criminal justice system. 179 In the end, rigid guidelines, despite their noble intentions, suffocate an otherwise legitimate exercise of sentencing discretion without providing corresponding assurance that vindictive resentencing is any less probable. 1 8 0
The Preferred Construction of the Pearce Rule: Summary
The Pearce rule should be construed only to require a sentencing authority to articulate its reasons for increasing a defendant's punishment on reconviction. These reasons should be based upon information which was not known to the sentencing authority during the original sentencing proceeding. 18 1 If these reasons prove 176 See, e.g., Wasman, 468 U.S. at 572. Authorities supporting flexibility in sentencing on retrial rely on four rationales: (1) a prior sentence has no legal existence because it was imposed pursuant to a void conviction; (2) by utilizing a post-conviction remedy, the defendant waived any benefit he may have had from a prior sentence; (3) the appellate court has no authority to revise a sentence imposed by a trial court within statutory limits; and (4) a new trial and sentence does not foreclose an independent consideration of the sentence at a second trial. Alstyne, supra note 168, at 610-11. 177 See, e.g., supra note 176. Balancing the defendant's right to a sentence not in excess of that prescribed by law is the societal interest in punishing them when their guilt has been established. Inherent in this societal interest is the fundamental principle that a convicted felon should receive a sentence appropriate to the gravity of the offense and the character and propensities of the offender. 180 Consider, for example, the fact that a trial court judge could sentence a defendant vindictively even if his sentence were limited by an absolute prohibition on harsher resentencing. The trial court judge could simply do so by imposing a greater sentence than that which the defendant otherwise deserved in light of "new information" produced upon retrial.
181 Pearce, 395 U.S. at 726; the extent of information not known to the original sentencing authority could constitute the same information relied upon in the original sentencing proceeding when different sentencing authorities are involved. The Pearce rule would be inapplicable in these circumstances under McCullough, and the enhanced sen-satisfactory upon broad appellate review, the increased sentence should be affirmed.
C. FEAR OF JUDICIAL VINDICTIVENESS: IS MCCULLOUGH THE BEST
ANSWER?
Justice Marshall, writing for the dissent in McCullough, argued that a broad construction of the Pearce rule cannot effectively relieve defendants of fear of retaliatory or vindictive treatment on retrial.
82
The dissent concluded that the possibility of receiving a more severe sentence on reconviction unconstitutionally deters defendants from appealing 8 3 their prior conviction and sentence. 1 8 4 Accordingly, the dissent advocates strict compliance with the Pearce rule requirements whenever the possibility of vindictiveness exists.
Criminal defendants have a constitutional right to appeal their prior conviction and sentence unimpeded by burdens imposed upon that right by fear of judicial vindictiveness.1 8 5 To the same extent, our criminal justice system has a legitimate interest in creating, in the minds of appellants and potential appellants, an awareness that if reconvicted they will incur punishment fully commensurate with the seriousness of their offense and their potential for rehabilitation. 1 8 6 In any discussion ofjudicial vindictiveness, the dispositive question is not whether the risk of harsher resentencing will impair the defendant's choice to appeal to an appreciable extent. 187 As the Court in McCullough clarified, the proper inquiry is whether there exists a significant possibility of vindictiveness upon resentencing that will effectively deter a reasonable defendant from exercising his constitutional right to appeal.' 8 8 Thus, a legitimately imposed tence, imposed upon the basis of no more information that that originally relied upon, would pass muster. See supra note 159 and accompanying text. 182 McCullough, 106 S. Ct. at 987 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
183
The term "appeal" is used here to mean either an appeal per se to the appellate court following a conviction, or a collateral attack on the conviction through application of a writ of habeas corpus in the federal district court. It makes no difference which route a defendant takes to obtain a new trial. In dealing with judicial vindictiveness, the Court has had to weigh the importance of the general privilege conferred upon criminal appellants by the Pearce presumption of judicial vindictiveness and its prophylactic rule, against the inroads of such a privilege on the fair administration ofjustice. 1 96 In its analysis, the Court in McCullough adopted a public policy rationale within which the Pearce presumption and its prophylactic rule are now circumscribed. 197 This policy reflects a desire to further the goals embraced in Pearce in juxtaposition with what the Court in McCullough properly regarded as the equally significant concerns of a criminal justice system in which deference to trial court sentencing discretion is a fundamental means of assessing just penalties.' 
The Gamble of Retrial: Summary
The Court in McCullough has struck, in the spirit of Wasman, a practical balance between actions deemed to unconstitutionally chill appeals and those actions that do not. 1 9 9 This balance recognizes that a residual "chilling effect" will always inhere in the legitimate sanction of increased sentences on reconviction. 20 0 Apprehension will exist as long as higher sentences may be imposed. This deterrent effect, however, is a product of a criminal justice system in which difficult government imposed choices are inevitable. 2 0 ' Since a defendant's life and character significantly influence the outcome of every criminal case, it will be difficult to limit these chilling effects beyond McCullough without obstructing the imposition of an otherwise well-reasoned and thoroughly considered sentence.
